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ABSTRACT
This article analyses policies and strategies adopted by Botswana,
Zambia and Zimbabwe in order to develop linkage industries from
the mineral sector. Whilst Southern Africa has a strongly integrated
regional value chain for equipment and services related to mining,
linkage development strategies in the three countries under
examination have been formulated within narrow domestic
frameworks. The evidence suggests that the success or failure of a
resource-based industrialisation approach is country and sector
specific, requiring the deployment of different and appropriately
tailored policy instruments. Our research uncovered important
cross-country variations in terms of opportunities created by
specific mineral commodities, ambition and scope of industrial and
linkage development strategies, and institutional capabilities to
ensure enforcement and coherence with other policies.
KEYWORDS
Mineral linkages; industrial
development; mineral value
chains; Southern Africa;
resource-based
industrialisation
JEL CLASSIFICATION
L5; L6; O1; O25
1. Introduction
The economies of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe are dependent on exports from well-
established mineral commodity sectors. This article looks at the policies and strategies
adopted to leverage mineral resources to foster upstream and downstream linkage indus-
tries and support upgrading of technological capabilities.1
Whilst the Sub-saharan Africa (SSA) record of resource-based industrialisation has
been patchy and generally disappointing, the historical experience of many resource-
rich countries elsewhere has shown that the mining sector can be leveraged to support
broader industrial and technological upgrading. Important factors underlying these suc-
cessful experiences include policy interventions effective in providing incentives to indus-
try, catalysing investment in education and indigenous technological capabilities, and
accessing foreign capital and know how.
The literature on technological capabilities suggests that in developing economies, skills
development, rather than research and development (R&D), provides the foundation to
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support technological upgrading. For this reason, this research focuses, among other
issues, on the coherence between industrial policies and human capital investment in
terms of engineering, technical and vocational skills.
The research uncovered important cross-country variations in terms of: the breadth
and depth of technological complexity of existing industrial sectors; opportunities
created by specific mineral commodities; the ambition and scope of industrial and
linkage development strategies; and institutional capabilities to ensure enforcement and
coherence with other policies. These factors have resulted in different outcomes in
terms of local upgrading trajectories and institutional coherence. The research is based
on a review of key policy and industry documents and interview data collected in 2015
and 2016 in Botswana, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 consists of the literature review. Sections 3–
5 discuss the case studies of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana. Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature review
The relationship between natural resource endowment and industrialisation has histori-
cally been viewed with some scepticism (Prebisch, 1950; Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997;
Auty, 2001). Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997) identified Dutch Disease as the main
growth-reducing factor affecting resource-rich economies. However, subsequent studies
argued that the success or failure of resource-based industrialisation rests on a more
complex set of factors such as capital market imperfections, human capital and weak
knowledge systems (Gylfason, 2001; De Ferranti et al., 2002; Stijns, 2005).
The roles of human capital and knowledge systems in particular are consistent with
economic history research focused on Scandinavia, Australia and the USA (David and
Wright, 1997; Wright and Czelusta, 2007). Sweden, Finland and Norway industrialised
through the development of industrial activity around their respective cereal, timber,
fish, oil and iron ore resources (Blomström and Kokko, 2007; Andersen, 2012). Domestic
knowledge clusters evolved, consisting of networks of private sector-led research institutes,
universities and firms, and public investment in industry-oriented skills formation, with
aligned public procurement policies. These initially adopted foreign technologies sub-
sequently adapted these and finally innovated beyond them. Examples of backward inte-
gration include Norway’s Statoil and oil-related capital equipment industries. The best
example of lateral migration is Nokia’s successful move from pulp and paper milling
into cellular technology.
The USA also developed through resource-based industrialisation around iron ore,
coal, lead, nickel, zinc, antimony, copper and oil, facilitated by an accommodating legal
environment, investment in infrastructure of public knowledge such as the US Geological
Survey and education in mining, minerals and metallurgy (Wright and Czelusta, 2007;
Andersen, 2012).2 Although heavily dependent on resource extraction, Australia under-
took massive investment in engineering education, training and R&D where mining
R&D accounted for 20% of total R&D in 1995/96 (Wright and Czelusta, 2007). Today
Australia is a world leader in mining software systems, home to global mining exploration
2By 1917 the USA had over 7500 mining engineers in the country.
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ventures and an important global supplier of high-tech services and equipment to meet the
demand for safer and cleaner mineral extraction and beneficiation processes.
The literature review indicates that opportunities for the development of downstream,
upstream and lateral industries are clearly country and sector specific (Andersen, 2012;
Morris et al., 2012; Morris and Fessehaie, 2014). Investment in domestic technological
capabilities, education and training, especially engineering and vocational skills, strong
public–private partnerships and alignment of different policy tools, including industrial
and mineral policies, as well as the respective countries’ policy frameworks and insti-
tutional capabilities emerge as recurrent factors. The relative success of suppliers of oil-
sector fabrication and construction in Nigeria can be ascribed to a combination of the
aforementioned policy recommendations (Oyejide and Adewuyi, 2011).3
Successful implementation of such programmes is difficult and more countries have
failed than have succeeded (Morris and Fessehaie, 2014; Rodrik, 2014; Ramdoo, 2015).
Poor implementation of linkage development policies has been a common problem in
Africa (Ado, 2013). The private sector has often been too weak to respond to policy incen-
tives and local demand (Ramdoo, 2015). Finally, as regional economic integration gains
momentum, it is obvious that linkage development policies in Africa are often designed
without considering the potential of regional value chains as markets and source/destina-
tion of investment projects (Fessehaie, 2015). Research on linkage development strategies
in SSA is limited, however, especially with regard to recent experiences and different
approaches adopted by countries since the commodities boom.4
3. Mining linkage development across the Southern African region
Trade analysis reveals significant regional integration across the mineral and mineral pro-
cessing value chain with Botswana, Namibia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and
Zimbabwe importing most of their capital equipment from South Africa (Table 1).
However, it appears that such regional integration may be unravelling, as evidenced by the
decline of South Africa’s market share of Zambia’s capital equipment imports between 2004
and 2014 (Table 2). That this took place during a period of huge Foreign direct investment
(FDI) inflows into Zambia’s mining sector should be of concern to regional policy-makers.5
On the other hand, the annual expenditure onmining capital equipment within the nexus
of inland countries Zambia, Zimbabwe and DRC demonstrates the potential for significant-
scale economy production activities. The policies pursued by individual countries for linkage
industries have largely failed to take into account these regional dynamics.
Linkage development from the mining sector has been high on the agenda of each
country examined in this article. Linkage development can take multiple forms: fiscal lin-
kages, consumption linkages, horizontal linkages (capabilities and investment benefitting
non-extractive sectors) and upstream and downstream linkages (Morris et al., 2012). Each
of these channels can potentially contribute to industrialisation by providing revenues for
service and physical infrastructure development, creating demand for manufactured goods
3Over time, local content in the Nigerian oil industry has increased from 3–5% in the 1970s, to 20% in 2004 and 39% in 2009
(estimates by Oyejide and Adewuyi, 2011).
4A recent contribution in this area has been the Making the Most of Commodities Programme (Morris et al., 2012).
5See http://www.miningweekly.com/article/copperbelt-capital-equipment-supply-must-be-mutually-beneficial-to-ensure-
sustainability-argues-researcher-2016-02-12/rep_id:3650. Accessed January 2017.
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and fostering productive capabilities linked to mining and beyond. The opportunities to
develop such linkages are commodity and country specific, but upstream linkages
present a ‘low hanging fruit’ compared with downstream linkages (Morris et al., 2012).
There are two-fold reasons for this: first, upstream linkages are diversified in terms of
entry barriers, capital and skills intensity and technological intensity, and hence offer
opportunities for a broad range of local industries. In contexts of low supplier capabilities,
there are services and goods that require low levels of skills, technology and capital, which
can be competitively supplied locally. On the contrary, mineral beneficiation requires large
lump-sum investment, foreign technologies and highly skilled personnel – scarce factors
in most African countries. Second, many countries in Africa have some level of existing
capabilities that can be leveraged for upstream linkage development. In the case studies,
Zambia and Zimbabwe’s mining sectors offer the scale and scope of economies for specific
categories of manufacturing activities, especially if one takes a regional perspective.
The opportunities for mineral beneficiation are more constrained due to limited scale,
capital intensity, cost of capital and distance to markets. In these cases, detailed feasibility
studies are required which are beyond the scope of this article. Botswana represents an
exception, due to the combination of high market share in global diamond output, and
state ownership in production (50% in Debswana). The success of the diamond beneficia-
tion policy hinged significantly on these two factors. Another set of determining variables
in the success of linkage development strategies relates to policy design, implementation
and monitoring, which are discussed in the following sections.
4. Resource-based industrialisation potential in Zambia
Following the 1969nationalisationofmining assets, upstreamanddownstream linkage devel-
opment became a critical component of Zambia’s industrialisation strategy (Fessehaie, 2012).
These policies succeeded in developing manufacturing firms, and a skilled local workforce
Table 1. South African capital equipment market share.
Country Average (2012–14), R billion South Africa (%)
Zambia 5.6 37
Namibia 4.7 63
Botswana 4.3 73
Mozambique 4.1 42
DRC 3.5 48
Zimbabwe 3.4 57
Angola 1.0 13
Tanzania 0.9 9
Swaziland 0.8 83
Malawi 0.6 25
Source: Trade map average is from 2013 to 2015.
Table 2. Mining capital equipment, South Africa’s market shares in Zambia 2004–14.
South Africa’s market share in Zambia Change
Product cluster 2004 (%) 2014 (%) 2004–14 (%)
Mineral processing equipment 60.2 26.7 −33.4
Off-road special vehicles 72.9 54.3 −18.6
Conveyor systems and others 58.2 52.3 −5.9
Pumps and valves 72.9 58.1 −14.8
Source: Fessehaie (2015).
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produced by an extensive technical and vocational education system sponsored by themining
sector. The breaking up and privatisation of mining assets, which were sold to foreign multi-
nationals, coincided with the structural adjustment programme which led to a radical policy
shift on mining upstream linkages. Trade liberalisation, the end of preferential mining pro-
curement policies and the withdrawal from any comprehensive approach to industrial
policy exposed the local manufacturing sector to competition. At the same time, local firms
were not supported in adjusting to the new economic landscape (Fessehaie, 2012; Fessehaie
and Morris, 2013). This took place in difficult economic circumstances characterised by
low commodity prices and macroeconomic instability. Additionally, local firms saw the
erosionof scale economies required to sustain localmanufacturing, scale economies once sup-
ported by supplying the state-owned mining company as a sole entity.
As a result of these developments, the local mining content is now low. Extrapolating
from data from four large mining companies, the total industry procurement of goods was
estimated to be around US$1.75 billion annually, of which only 5% (or US$87 million)
represented locally manufactured goods (International Council on Mining and Metals,
2014). Research findings point to the following factors impeding the supply of mining
inputs from domestic manufacturers:
. Mining firms’ procurement strategies, including practices of outsourcing procurement
of an entire category of supplies (e.g. health and safety equipment) to solution providers
who procure directly from global suppliers.
. Information asymmetry: mining house procurement lack knowledge of what is locally
available.
. Domestic manufacturer’s weak entrepreneurship skills: potential suppliers do not know
how to access procurement opportunities by the mining sector.
. High cost of finance for working and investment capital.
. Low technological capabilities and weak quality assurance mechanisms.
4.1. Policy framework
The various components of Zambia’s policy framework are not consistent in targeting
resource-based industrialisation. The national Vision 2030 (Government of the Republic
of Zambia, 2006) and the Sixth National Development Plan 2011–15 (Government of the
Republic of Zambia, 2011) target increasedmining value addition through special economic
zones and FDI, among others. While the 2008 Commercial, Trade and Industrial Policy
does not refer to either copper beneficiation or local content (Government of the Republic
of Zambia, 2008), the 2012 Strategy for the Engineering Manufacturing Sector targets
copper fabrication (Government of the Republic of Zambia, 2012a) and the 2012 Cabinet
Strategy Paper on Industrialisation and Job Creation (Government of the Republic of
Zambia, 2012b) aims to enforce Section 13 of the Mines and Minerals Development Act
(Government of the Republic of Zambia, 2013) on local content.6 However at the time of
fieldwork, none of these policies and strategies had been implemented, reflecting structural
challenges in terms of resources, institutional capabilities and political will. This is
6The Mines and Mineral Development Policy (2013) aims to address the issue of local content.
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exacerbated by poor engagement by industry, which has generally not participated in gov-
ernment-led sectoral initiatives to design interventions for critical sectors.
Key stakeholders argue that the policy objectives are not clear enough, that they lack
coherence and coordination and that there is poor implementation capability. Recent pol-
icies have aimed to promote indigenous ownership, through the Citizen Economic
Empowerment Commission Act, but this had little impact on local value addition. More-
over, the government has not leveraged its 10–15% shareholding in individual mining
companies to monitor and enforce agreements on local content.
An illustrative example of policy incoherence is the divergence between the ministry
responsible for industry, which wants mandatory local content provisions, and the
Zambia Development Agency responsible for FDI, which regards local content measures
as blunt instruments and favours a gradual, targeted approach to localisation, coupled with
support for manufacturers. Moreover, the Zambia Development Agency is charged with
FDI promotion through Multi-Facility Economic Zones. These create incentives for
foreign firms which are not always consistent with a localisation agenda, for example
through duty-free import incentives. At the same time, Zambia’s national import tariff
system discourages local assembly with duties on inputs and components, and often
zero-rated imports of assembled equipment. Finally, industrial policies do not provide
incentives for local manufacturers to upgrade their technological capabilities and skills.
4.2. Industry strategies in promoting local content
The main policy instrument used to support downstream beneficiation has been FDI pro-
motion, through granting fiscal and non-fiscal incentives to foreign investors. Chinese
investors responded by building an industrial park in Chambishi (Copperbelt Province)
in 2007.7 The investment targets copper semi-fabricates manufacturing, but interviews
with the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry in early 2016 suggest that this
project is still in the pipeline. Policy developments around upstream linkage development,
on the other hand, have been more complex and involved a multitude of institutional and
private-sector actors.
Although the corporate procurement strategies of private mining companies varied,
they have increasingly relied on direct imports and sourcing from a large network of
local agents and subsidiaries, exacerbated by strong political connections on company
boards and large importing agents. Procurement managers are assessed on the basis of
total cost of procurement and not on local sourcing, hence they are not incentivised to
invest in local supplier development. Chinese and Indian mining companies have gener-
ally been reluctant to engage in formal or informal mechanisms of local supplier
development.8
In response to the contradictory policy initiatives, the Zambia Association of Manufac-
turers has taken a leading role in driving the local content agenda, with little support from
the government, through the Zambia Mining Local Content Initiative. The Chamber of
7Non-Ferrous China Africa (NFCA) from China, although relatively small in terms of copper output, has been fast-growing
and has invested in the Chambishi Zambia–China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, an investment worth US$800
million, inclusive of the Chambishi Copper Smelter, acid plants as well as a copper semi-fabricates manufacturing plant.
8Many Zambian and regional suppliers have, however, been able to do business with the Chinese mining companies (Fes-
sehaie and Morris, 2013). These firms supply critical equipment and are highly competitive.
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Mines is participating so as to be seen to be contributing to localisation to avert mandatory
requirements from being adopted by government. The main activities of the Local Content
Initiative revolve around Business-to-Business activities. In addition the Zambia Associ-
ation of Manufacturers, with support from the UK international cooperation agency, is
screening local suppliers with the intention of subsequently providing business develop-
ment services.
There is no training or skills development obligation on the mining companies under
current Zambian legislation. The Zambian government has been discussing a mandatory
skills levy, but on the industry side, part of the reason for opposing the levy has been
concern about the ability of the government to collect and spend the levies appropriately.
This resulted in the setting up of the Zambia Mining Skills and Education Trust at the end
of 2014. All of the major mining companies (except Chinese-owned Chambishi) have
joined the initiative, under the Chamber of Mines. The Zambia Mining Skills and Edu-
cation Trust was expected to become operational by the end of 2015, with strategies in
place and, more importantly, financing.
4.3. Conclusions
Despite the recent commodity price decline, there is latent potential in Zambia’s domestic
manufacturing sector to respond to the significant demand for mining inputs. Analysis
reveals an important conflict in Zambia’s policy around legislation and regulation
aimed at increased local content. The conflict straddles mining and industrial policy fra-
meworks. At a political level there has been increasing pressure to revive local manufac-
turing supplying the mining sector; however, this has failed to result in a comprehensive
vision on local content. Different policies and organisations within the Ministry of Com-
merce, Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development and the
Zambia Development Agency have or are developing separate approaches to local
content measures which create policy uncertainty.
As a result of weak policy frameworks, and possibly to avert mandatory regulations, the
private sector has taken the lead, with domestic manufacturing interests setting up a local
content programme, and mining houses setting up a skills development fund. However, it
is unlikely that private-sector initiatives will be able to address the structural constraints to
manufacturing competitiveness. The latter requires a comprehensive approach, with effec-
tive and coordinated public interventions to address access to finance, engineering, tech-
nical and vocational skills and infrastructure development.
5. Resource-based industrialisation in Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe’s industrial development evolved around its mining sector, with significant
diversification taking place since the 1920s (Jourdan et al., 2012). Except for platinum
and gold, most of Zimbabwe’s copper, iron ore and ferrochrome mineral output used
to be locally processed (Hawkins, 2009). The manufacturing sector production capabilities
encompassed ball mills, conveyors, rail and rolling stock, pumps, headgear, ventilation
ducting, electrical equipment mining chemicals and explosives (Jourdan et al., 2012).
During the 1980s and 1990s, the education system produced most of the technical, engin-
eering and managerial skills required by the mining and manufacturing sectors.
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The economic crisis in the early 2000s eroded these capabilities. Real gross domestic
product cumulatively declined by over 50% between 2000 and 2008. Manufacturing
capacity utilisation declined from approximately 80% in 2000 to 10% in 2008 (MEPIP,
2011; Government of Zimbabwe, 2013), and capacity utilisation in the engineering and
metals sector has declined from 36.7% in 2012 to 27.7% in 2013 (ZEPARU, 2014).
Some firms shifted from manufacturing to distribution while some international Original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) sold their subsidiaries to local investors. Large seg-
ments of foundry, metal fabrication and heavy machinery sectors closed down after
2000 and have been unable to fully resurrect pre-crisis capabilities after 2012.
The Zimbabwe Chamber of Mines estimates that more than half of the industry’s
skilled personnel emigrated from the country since 2007, negatively affecting the
mining industry, supplier firms as well as teaching and technology institutions
(Hawkins, 2009). This is reflected by the extent of brain drain and the performance of
national research and teaching institutes such as the Institute of Mining Research and
the Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre.
Since 2010, FDI inflows have resumed from a low level, coupled with significant
imports of capital equipment. The mining sector is currently the main driver of economic
recovery in Zimbabwe, underpinning the battered but still diversified manufacturing and
engineering sectors which recorded a slight recovery in capacity utilisation to 44% in 2012
(World Bank, 2014).
The apparent latent potential for further resource-based industrial recovery is hampered
by a number of supply-side constraints, including access to finance to replace obsolete
machinery, high input costs, volatile financial environment, unstable power and water
supply, licensing and permits, unpredictable fiscal regulations, political instability, corrup-
tion and crime (Davies et al., 2012; Jourdan et al., 2012;World Bank, 2014; ZEPARU, 2014).
5.1. Policy framework and implementation
A number of policy components could potentially impact on linkages between the mining
and manufacturing sector. Zimbabwe’s Mid-Term Plan 2011–15 prioritises employment
creation and equitable growth through, among others, indigenisation and beneficiation
(forward linkages).9 Although the machinery and equipment sector is targeted for invest-
ment promotion, no reference is made to the sector’s backward linkages to mining.
Equally, local content issues are not included in the most recent documents, the Zimbabwe
Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation 2013–18,10 and the Industrial
Development Policy 2012–16.11
However, coordinated implementation of industrial and trade policies has been very
weak, and there is no support to upgrade firm competitiveness and technological compe-
tencies. Overall, the government has focused on mineral beneficiation and indigenisation
rather than local content issues. Until recently, there appears to have been a disconnect
with mineral policies, regulated by the 2005 Mines and Minerals Act which does not
9See Fessehaie and Morris (2013).
10This intervention, however, is not included in the Value Addition and Beneficiation Cluster Matrix (Government of Zim-
babwe, 2013:103–13).
11The objectives of Government of Zimbabwe’s (2012) Industrial Development Policy 2012–16 are: contribution of manu-
facturing to gross domestic product of 30% by 2015, 50% of total exports by 2015, capacity utilisation of 80% by 2016.
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include very strong provisions on local content.12 Policy-makers have for a number of
years delayed the finalisation of a Minerals Policy which links resource extraction
rights, royalties and mineral taxation with backward, forward, spatial linkage development
obligations.13 During the last part of 2015, however, under pressure from organised
business, local content had begun to feature on the political agenda.
Current mineral beneficiation and value addition levels are very low, reflected by 90%
of Zimbabwe’s minerals being exported in raw or semi-processed form (ZEPARU, 2014).
Recently, concerns over tax avoidance are leading policy-makers to consider beneficiation
as a mechanism to introduce transparency in the sector so as to force mining companies to
declare output values.
5.2. Industry strategies
Of US $800 million spent during annual operations (excluding capital expenditure) on
materials and consumables by the mining sector in 2012, Kwesu (2015) estimated
around US $400 million was locally sourced. The largest inputs included electric power
($80 million), iron and steel products ($50 million), distribution ($50 million) and non-
electrical machinery and equipment ($40 million). These figures, however, do not reflect
the extent of local value addition taking place: these goods and services are largely
sourced from local distributors rather than producers, hence with little value added content.
It appears that there is a latent potential to resurrect past capabilities around
crushing equipment, engineering services, mill balls, other foundry products, liners
and chemicals, wire rod products (ropes, chains and slings) and castings (mantles,
bowls, mill liners, locomotive wagons, frames, slagpots, ladles) (ZEPARU, 2014; Con-
federation of Zimbabwe Industries interviews). However, mining companies view
local supplies as of high cost, unreliable, of poor quality, with poor back-up services
and requiring upfront payment. Manufacturers attribute these constraints to high
domestic operating costs and unreliable input markets. Firms involved in mineral
extraction are of the view that local content obligations should not be imposed
until infrastructural bottlenecks and high domestic manufacturing costs are
addressed. This view seems to also be adopted by the Ministry of Economic Planning
and Investment Promotion.
The Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries is lobbying government for increased
industry-specific trade protection for limited duration. While the agro-processing sector
has been targeted, it appears to be a collection of ad hoc interventions possibly driven
by the relative power of different domestic vested interests in specific industries, rather
than a structured strategy to revitalise local manufacturing.
5.3. Conclusions
Zimbabwe’s policy framework is in flux. As in the case of Zambia, a conflict prevails
between the extractive mining policy institutions and the institutions responsible for
12The Act states that an applicant for a special mining lease should submit a plan which includes information on the extent
to which local goods and services will be utilised in the development. Bullet point (xii) of paragraph (e) of sub-section 3 of
section 158.
13Other mining-related policy measures include a draft mining exploration bill, rebuilding the national geological survey
units to ensure government has leverage in negotiating mining rights, and support for small-scale mining sector.
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industrial and trade policy. The overall economic decline appears to have deepened the
policy conflict. The state is interested in securing higher revenues from the mining
sector and securing higher levels of local ownership in the industry. These interests
have opened a series of negotiations with the mining companies which will determine
the future of the industry.
The overall economic decline of the Zimbabwe economy has impacted severely on the
country’s productive manufacturing capacity. Industrial activity seems to be more signifi-
cantly impacted by regular power outages, unreliable and expensive supply chains and an
unfavourable financial environment, setting Zimbabwe apart from Zambia and Botswana.
A once very diversified and competitive mining inputs cluster has been eroded. The
highest priority today lies in rebuilding linkages between the mining companies and the
local manufacturing basis.
In the high-level power struggle over mining rights and revenues, local content issues
have been relatively marginalised. The decline of the National System of Innovation (NSI)-
has also impacted negatively on the mining inputs cluster, with loss of skilled workers
from the firms and skilled technicians and researchers from training and research
institutions.
To arrest and reverse the decline, it is critically important that the mining companies
cooperate with industry to develop local supply chains, given that government resources
are very limited. Even though Zimbabwe still has high-quality infrastructure compared to
other African countries, firms’ lack of access to finance has prevented them from upgrad-
ing equipment. Access to finance, and upgrading and maintaining utilities are two key
areas where government intervention should focus.
6. Resource-based industrialisation in Botswana
6.1. Policy framework and implementation
Botswana’s economy has historically been dependent on diamond extraction, although
mining has declined from 56% of gross domestic product in 1990 to 33% in 2014. In
1996, Botswana adopted the long-term Vision 2016, targeting economic diversification.
Sectoral strategies were later identified through the Economic Diversification Drive
2011–16 (Government of Botswana, 2011). Subsequent National Development Plans for
2003–09 and 2009–16 established six hubs, namely Diamond, Health, Education, Agricul-
ture, Innovation and Transport (Government of Botswana, 2008), with associated insti-
tutional support measures for implementation.
In earlier decades, Botswana’s government leveraged its unique position as the world’s
largest and highest-quality gem diamond producer by establishing a strategic relationship
with De Beers in a 50%–50% government–De Beers joint venture called Debswana. In re-
negotiating Debswana’s mining licence renewal in 2005, the Botswana government lever-
aged its 50% position in Debswana, effectively forcing De Beers to support diamond ben-
eficiation14 by physically relocating its global sorting and valuing operation from London
14More recently, there have been also initiatives to develop local suppliers. Launched in 2014, the Chamber of Mines’
Business Development Forum represents the mining industry’s objectives to develop local suppliers whilst creating effi-
ciency and cost savings for the mining companies. The Chamber also coordinates purchasing power to support local com-
panies and attracts FDI from foreign OEMs (Botswana Chamber of Mines, 2014). Tokafala, established in 2013 and funded
by Anglo American De Beers and Debswana, is the leading private programme which supports enterprise development.
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to Botswana and by actively encouraging domestic marketing, polishing and cutting activi-
ties (Mbayi, 2011). Unlike most other commodities, De Beers exerts significant market
power on domestic and global production of gem diamonds, as well as global marketing
and distribution channels.
Botswana’s beneficiation policy has been well articulated, with clear targets, a combi-
nation of export restrictions, penalties and fiscal incentives, private and public investment
in public goods and skills, and effective implementation mechanisms. In 2013, Botswana’s
polished diamond exports totalled US$759 million and employment increased from 2200
workers in 2008 to 3750 in 2013. Skills transfer has been a key element of the beneficiation
strategy because cutting and polishing is skills intensive. Botswana has actively used its
work permit regulations to maximise the development of domestic cutting and polishing
skills, acquired mainly through on-the-job and in-house training.
However, a global glut in the diamond market precipitated a significant decline in
cutting and polishing activities in 2015, resulting in the closure of a number of firms in
Botswana and 500 job losses against a total workforce of 3750 (Grynberg, 2015; Mining
Weekly, 2015, 9 June). Within this crisis, Botswana’s government has not been in a pos-
ition to formulate a decisive response because it had conflicting interests in two different
stages of the value chain, at the rough production stage and the cutting and polishing stage.
Policy has focused on leveraging linkages and diversifying out of resource depen-
dence, although some inconsistencies have emerged recently. Most recently, the 2014
New Industrial Development Policy acknowledged factors impeding diversification as
ineffective coordination and implementation of industrial policy initiatives, low firm
technological capabilities, inadequate infrastructure and mismatch of industry skills
(Government of Botswana, 2014). At the institutional level, there is significant level
of fragmentation with the Ministry of Minerals, Energy and Water Resources respon-
sible for diamond beneficiation, the Ministry for Agriculture responsible for agro-pro-
cessing industries and the Ministry of Trade and Industry responsible for other
manufacturing activities.
The 2008 Botswana Excellence Strategy represents the government intention to move
Botswana towards a knowledge economy. Until now, innovation was hampered by a
number of factors. Interviews highlighted that the main gaps in the development of a
dynamic NSI consist of insufficient R&D funding, poor commercialisation and weak man-
agement skills of start-up firms. Two key institutions have been created to implement the
national innovation strategy: the Botswana Institute for Technology Research and Inno-
vation, to coordinate and undertake basic research and to identify, absorb and innovate
technologies; and the Botswana Innovation Hub, with a mandate to attract FDI in inno-
vation-driven economic activities, develop a science and technology park, and support com-
mercialisation of innovation and intellectual property protection of domestic innovators.
6.2. Conclusions
Botswana’s beneficiation policy has been characterised by remarkably ambitious goals,
coherent design and effective implementation. Within a decade, Botswana has moved up
the global diamond value chain, increasing its participation in sorting and valuing, market-
ing, and cutting and polishing. The critical factor in this trajectory was the government’s
50% stake upstream in Debswana, and the institutional capability to mobilise state resources
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effectively by providing an industrial park and government support services to the benefi-
ciation industry. Good relationships with the private sector were important to uncover com-
petitiveness bottlenecks and address them, whilst political leadership gave sufficient
credibility to the policy to ensure that firms relocated to Botswana and invested in in-
house skills development. It is nevertheless too early to assess whether the diamond proces-
sing industry is sustainable beyond the depletion of diamonds, given that processing indus-
tries in other countries are more cost competitive (India) or more sophisticated (Belgium).
The recent price crisis for cut and polished stones due to a glut of supply in the market
has exposed the vulnerability of Botswana’s beneficiation strategy. As firms shut down and
retrenched workers, the state was not in a position to intervene. Its ownership stake
upstream allowed it to extract higher rents from rough diamond sales such that restricting
rough diamond supply would have been counterproductive.
In a bid to diversify the economy away from diamonds and taking into account the
structural challenges facing a strategy aiming for large-scale industrialisation, Botswana
is now moving towards becoming a knowledge economy. Whilst it is too early to assess
the outcomes, it seems that some of the ingredients of the beneficiation policy have
been replicated. There is a strong private–public partnership, a Hub to coordinate different
policy instruments, a technology park to allow for agglomeration effects and shared facili-
ties, a mix of incentives and performance requirements, access to foreign skills coupled
with strong training and knowledge transfer requirements, and a willingness for direct
state investment if necessary.
7. Conclusions
This article has analysed the design, implementation and effectiveness of mineral linkage
development strategies in Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
The countries have well-established mining sectors, which have enabled the growth and
deepening of human capital, institutional competences, the NSI and, in some cases,
upstream industries related to mining. In all of these contexts, policies have played a criti-
cal role in opening up (or closing down) opportunities for resourced-based industrialis-
ation. This happened in Botswana in 2005, in Zambia in the 1970s and in Zimbabwe in
the late 1960s–70s. In Botswana, the government intervened through the beneficiation
policy, direct ownership in Debswana and investment in the Diamond Technology
Park. In Zambia and Zimbabwe, upstream industries were developed through import sub-
stitution policies. In Zambia, state ownership of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines
(ZCCM) and some large manufacturers was also key. In Botswana, no polish and
cutting industry was set up until the government promoted beneficiation; and in
Zambia, the mining inputs cluster declined when the government withdrew drastically
from any form of industrial policy.
Our analysis suggests that there is an important role for government in the linkage devel-
opment trajectory of resource-rich countries. Left to market forces, these linkage industries
may not take off or may take off only with limited value addition and technological capa-
bilities. The article also demonstrates that the success or failure of a resource-based indus-
trialisation approach is country and sector specific, requiring the deployment of different
and appropriately tailored policy instruments. Furthermore, the shaping of resource-
based industrialisation policies and the extent to which they are implemented (or not
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implemented) is heavily influenced by power relationships within a specific economy and
relationships across different segments of the domestic and global value chains for specific
resource types and the value chains of products purchased by resource firms.
The analysis of trends in regional trade points to an integrated regional value chain, in
which South Africa plays a supply-hub role for the rest of the region. This position,
however, is threatened by significant and growing imports of capital goods from
outside the region. Realising the respective country’s latent productive potential will
require greater coordination and integration of national mining and industrial policies
in alignment with the corporate strategies of domestic and transnational firms operating
across the region. Yet, at the moment, every country is designing its upstream linkage pol-
icies within narrow domestic frameworks.
In Zambia and Zimbabwe, there is significant conflict around legislation and regulation
aimed at increased local content. While this conflict is visible mainly between extractive
mining policy and industrial policy institutions, and often depicted as policy ‘incoherence’,
it is actually reflective of the conflict between divergent domestic and global interest
groups. It would appear that in Zambia and Zimbabwe the domestic manufacturing inter-
ests are not sufficiently organised or powerful enough to influence national policy-makers
and/or policy implementers.
The stability of the global diamond commodity market, a De Beers monopoly initially
and later a global oligopoly, underpinned the success of Botswana’s resource-based devel-
opment policy approach, which has prioritised mineral beneficiation. Other countries
have not had the advantage of prolonged diamond rent stability and have been unable
to leverage mineral rights legislation to the same extent. At the same time, other countries
have larger demand size and economies of scale to justify more ambitious upstream
linkage development policies.
In conclusion, the regional market offers, for selected goods and services, sufficient scale
to drive the development of competitive domestic supply industries. A recent study esti-
mates the inputs market for the Southern Africa Development Community region – with
mining projects worth US$50 billion – to be as high as the European and Chinese
markets together (Jourdan, 2015). Both countries have existing or latent productive
capacity, based on the legacy of past industrial development and their respective NSIs.
These opportunities cannot be pursued in isolation from the region, however, but should
rather be tapped into through cooperation and coordination with other regional partners.
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